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Abstract 
In recent years an increasing number of European governments have decided to hold 
referendums on European issues. Whether it is the Treaty of Nice, participation in EMU, 
the European Constitution or the Treaty of Lisbon, whether the referendum is legally 
required (e.g. Ireland) or government induced (e.g. France), the number of European 
referendums has increased. This increase has been accompanied, more often than not, by 
negative outcomes. Starting with the Danish rejection of the Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU) in 1992, there has been an increase in negative outcomes in European 
referendums. These negative outcomes, along with fall in public support (see 
Eurobarometers) and the rise of Eurosceptic parties across Europe have brought public 
opinion to the centre of the political and academic debate, casting doubts about the 
resilience of the citizens’ “permissive consensus”. Whether it has become a “constraining 
dissensus” or not, the fact remains that there is a gap between Europe and its citizens and 
it seems to be widening.  
 
Several rationales have been put forward to explain the European referendums’ 
outcomes, mainly focusing on each country at a time. Within this debate, this paper aims 
to provide a holistic approach to voting in European referendums by exploring voting 
behaviour in five countries (Spain, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland). 
First, this paper will explore the motivations behind citizens’ negative or positive voting. 
Secondly, it will look into the relation between citizens’ levels of information and voting 
behaviour in European referendums. For this purpose, there will be a qualitative analysis 
of the post-referendum Eurobarometers surveys, of the referendums in Spain, France, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg on the European Constitution and Ireland on the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The argument put forward will be that information levels play a crucial role in 
influencing the voting behaviour of European citizens, in that it is associated both with 
abstention and negative voting. 
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I. Introduction 
Referendums are the most direct way by which people can influence a political process.
1 
A referendum can be defined as a direct popular vote to approve or reject a proposed or 
existing governmental policy or institution.
2 Recently, referendums, and European 
referendums in particular, have attracted increased attention in the scholarly community. 
Some scholars focus on the general institutional, political and legal context in which a 
referendum is decided and in which the campaigns are run. Most authors highlight the 
distinction between legally required referendums and referendums called by 
governments. Several scholars have linked the institutional context of a referendum with 
voting behaviour. For example, Suksi (1993) classified referendums according to whether 
or not the outcome of the popular vote is binding and stressed that when the referendum 
is binding, the citizens effectively have the last word in a ratification procedure.
3 
Schneider and Weitsman (1996) suggest that punishment strategies of voters are of 
central importance in referendums.
4 The authors argue that voters may have to choose 
between accepting an agreement on the basis of its merit and risk rewarding a 
government that has not successfully managed domestic politics, or rejecting the treaty, 
thereby punishing a popular government that negotiated and supported ratification of the 
agreement. Similarly, Hug and Sciarini (2000) develop a theoretical argument on how 
voting behaviour is influenced by institutional factors, like whether a referendum is 
constitutionally necessary or non-required and non-binding. In the second case, it is more 
probable government supporters will vote mainly on the issue at hand, and less as a “vote 
of confidence” for the government.
5  
 
                                                 
1 This paper uses “referendums” as the plural form of referendum, as recommended by the editors of the 
Oxford English Dictionary: ‘In terms of its Latin origin, referendums is logically preferable as a modern 
plural form meaning ballots on one issue (as Latin gerund referendum has no plural); the Latin plural 
gerundive referenda, meaning “things to be referred”, necessarily connotes a plurality of issues’. 
2 Ranney A. (ed) (1981) The referendum device, London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, p.xi 
3 Suksi M. (1993) Bringing in the people: A comparison of constitutional forms and practices of the 
referendum, Dordtrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
4 Schneider G. and Weitsman P.A. (1996) “The punishment trap: Integration referendums as popularity 
contests”, Comparative Political Studies, vol.28, no.4, pp.582-607  
5 Hug S. and Sciarini P. (2000) “Referendums on European integration: Do institutions matter in the voter’s 
decision?”, Comparative Political Studies, vol.33, no.1, p.32, See also Hug S. (2002) Voices of Europe: 
Citizens, referendums, and European integration, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers   4
Other scholars have focused on the interplay between domestic politics and a 
government’s decision to hold a referendum. For instance, King (1991) highlighted that a 
government might use a referendum to strengthen its own position (plebiscite), or in 
order to legitimize a given proposal.
6 Bogdanor (1994) stressed the importance of the 
person or institution in triggering the decision to call a referendum, highlighting that 
“where the power to call a referendum lies in the hands of government, it is likely to 
prove a tactical weapon in strengthening its powers”.
7 In this context, González (2006) 
examined the motivations behind the decisions of ten member state governments to hold 
a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty (CT), and argued that political actors used the 
possibility to hold referendums about European matters in a strategic way to strengthen 
their positions in a the domestic context, rather than to correct the democratic deficit of 
the EU, i.e. in an attempt to give legitimacy to the decisions of the EU.
8  
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s there is a tendency of national governments to resort to 
referendums, either as way of resolving a matter of domestic debate (e.g. to join or not 
the euro) or as way of ratifying EU treaties. Nonetheless, there is a debate on the use of 
referendums on European issues. Some argue that European issues are inherently too 
complicated to be simplified to a “yes or no” question. Referendums on Europe 
oversimplify texts, which are effectively compromises between different national 
positions, and are often difficult for the expert to comprehend, let alone the average 
citizen. On the contrary, those in favour of European referendums claim that, as they are 
high visibility events, they provide an opportunity to draw the attention of citizens on 
Europe, and make political parties articulate more coherent arguments regarding 
European integration. Furthermore, many academics view referendums as a way to 
reduce the EU’s democratic deficit.
9 Resorting to direct democracy is viewed by some as 
                                                 
6 King A. (1991) “Referendums and the European Community” in Ranney A. (ed.) The referendum device, 
Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute pp.113-122 
7 Bogdanor V. (1994) “Western Europe” in Butler D. and Ranney A. (eds) Referendums around the world, 
London: Macmillan, pp.24-97, p.31 
8 González G.M. (2006) “Domestic politics and referendums on the Constitutional Treaty”, EUI Working 
Paper, Robert Schuman Centre, 2006/32, Florence: European University Institute, p.13 
9 Weiler J. (1997) “The European Union belongs to its citizens: Three immodest proposals” European Law 
Review, vol.22, no.2, pp.150-56. Grande E. (2000) “Post-national democracy in Europe” in Greven M. and 
Louis W. (eds) (2000) Democracy beyond the state: The European dilemma and the emerging global   5
a mechanism to counterbalance the limited democratic mechanisms in the EU. For 
instance, Habermas (2001) has argued in favour of European-wide referenda, which 
“would give citizens broader opportunities and more effective means to participate in the 
shaping of policies”.
10  
 
Finally, there are some who argue that referendums are a useful tool for democracy, 
provided there is a lengthy information campaign which will enable voters to 
comprehend all the aspects of the issue on which the referendum is conducted. 
Referendums strengthen democracy on the condition that there is sufficient time for a 
proper public debate and accurate information, through a vibrant public sphere.
11 In this 
vein, for example, some have accused the Dutch government on running a very short 
campaign on the Dutch referendum in 2005 for the CT. 
 
In any case, since the early 1990s, more and more referendums are conducted on 
European issues and European leaders have increasingly chosen this way of ratifying 
European treaties (as opposed to ratification through a parliamentary vote).  
In some countries, like Ireland, referendums are required by law and are foreseen by the 
national constitution on issues which affect the sovereignty of the country. As a result, 
Ireland has seen a total of seven referendums since its accession to the European 
Community: on the accession to the EEC in 1972, on the Single European Act in 1987, 
on the Treaty on the EU in 1992, on the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1998, two referendums 
on the Treaty of Nice - the outcome of the first referendum (2001) was negative and that 
of the second (2002) was positive - and one on the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008, which had a 
negative result.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
order, Lanham: Rowmann and Littlefield, pp.115-38, Schmitter P. (2000) How to democratize the Euro-
polity … and why bother?, Lanham: Rowmann and Littlefield 
10 Habermas J. (2001) “Why Europe needs a Constitution”, New Left Review, no.11, September / October, 
pp.5-26  
11 E.g. J. Habermas, Nouvel Observateur, 7 May 2005, Fossum J.E. and Trenz H-J (2006) “When the 
people come in: Constitution-making and the belated politicisation of the European Union, European 
Governance Papers (EUROGOV), No.C-06-03, http://www.connex-network.org, p.4   6
In other countries, like Denmark, there is a tradition of referendums on European 
treaties. According to Article 20 of the Danish Constitution, any law that requires 
granting sovereignty should be subject to a referendum, if not approved by at least a 
majority of 5/6 of the Danish parliament. However, in 1971 all major parties agreed that 
even if the Accession Treaty to the EC received parliamentary approval, a referendum 
would be held. Thus a tradition began on holding referendums on European issues. 
Furthermore, as Buch and Hansen (2002) point out, Europe is a very divisive issue 
among Danish political parties and referendums are a way to separate domestic politics 
from European issues.
12  Referendums in Denmark are held because of political reasons 
and not because of legal reasons. Six referendums have been held in Denmark: on the 
accession to the EEC in 1972, on the SEA in 1986, on the Treaty on the EU in 1992 and 
1993 (the first referendum’s result was negative and the second’s positive), on the Treaty 
of Amsterdam in 1998 and on the adoption of the euro in 2000, which resulted in 
Denmark remaining outside the European and Monetary Union (EMU). 
On the contrary, in Germany no referendum has ever been held as it expressly prohibited 
by the Constitution. Also, no referendums on European issues have taken place in 
Greece,  Portugal and Belgium. In other countries, referendums have been held 
occasionally, following a government decision. 
 
As shown in Table 1, four referendums on European issues were held in the 1970s: The 
issue was the accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland to the EEC and the 
referendums were held in these three countries respectively, as well as in France. All of 
them had positive results.
13 
 
During the 1980s, three referendums took place. Two of them were held in Ireland and 
Denmark for the SEA. The third took place in Italy (the only Italian referendum on 
                                                 
12 Buch R. and Hansen K.M. (2002) “The Danes and Europe: From EC 1972 to Euro 2000 – Elections, 
referendums and attitudes”, Scandinavian Political Studies, vol.25, no.1, pp.1-24, p.8, Lauring Knudsen A-
C “Euroscepticism in Denmark” in Szczerbiak A. and Taggart P. (eds) (2008) Opposing Europe: The 
comparative party politics of Euroscepticism vol.1 – Case studies and country surveys, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p.155 
13 In the 1970s, two more referendums were held, in Greenland and Norway on accession to the EEC, 
which had negative outcomes and resulting in these two countries staying out of the EEC.   7
European issues). The Italian referendum was consultative and the question was on 
providing the government with a mandate to draw up a constitution for Europe (in view 
of the Intergovernmental Conference on Economic and Monetary Union and Political 
Union). All referendums had positive results. 
 
Table 1.  Referendums on European issues – Results  
Year Country  Issue  Turnout  Result 
1972 
(23 April) 
France 
On the accession of Denmark, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland to the EEC 
60.27% 
Yes 
68.31% 
1972 
(10 May)  
Ireland  Accession Treaty to the EC  70.88% 
Yes 
83.1% 
1972 
(2 October) 
Denmark  Accession Treaty to the EC  90.4%  
Yes 
63.29% 
1975 
(5June) 
United 
Kingdom 
Accession Treaty to the EC  64.03% 
Yes 
67.23% 
1986 
(27 Feb.) 
Denmark   Single European Act  75.39% 
Yes 
56.24% 
1987 
(26 May) 
Ireland  Single European Act   44.09% 
Yes 
69.92% 
1989 
(18 June) 
Italy 
Advisory referendum to give the 
government the mandate to draw up a 
constitution for Europe 
85.4% 
Yes 
88.06% 
1992 
(2 June) 
Denmark  Treaty on European Union (TEU)   83.1% 
 No 
 50.7% 
1992 
(18 June) 
Ireland  Treaty on European Union (TEU)  57.31% 
Yes 
68,.7% 
1992 
(20 Sept.) 
France  Treaty on European Union (TEU)  69.69% 
Yes 
51.05% 
1993 
(18 May)  
Denmark  Treaty on European Union (TEU) (2
nd) 85.5% 
Yes 
56.77%   8
1993  
(13 Nov.) 
Sweden  Accession Treaty to the EU  83.32% 
Yes 
52.74% 
1994 
(12 June) 
Austria  Accession Treaty to the EU  82.35% 
Yes 
66.58% 
1994  
(10 Oct.) 
Finland  Accession Treaty to the EU  70.4% 
Yes 
56.88% 
1998 
(22 May) 
Ireland  Treaty of Amsterdam   56.26% 
Yes 
61.74% 
1998 
(28 May) 
Denmark  Treaty of Amsterdam  76.24% 
Yes 
55.1% 
2000  
(28 Sept.) 
Denmark  Adoption of the euro  87.2% 
No 
53.21% 
2001 
(7 June) 
Ireland  Treaty of Nice   34.79% 
No  
53.8% 
2003 
(14 Sept.) 
Sweden 
Participation in EMU and adoption of 
the euro 
82.60% 
No 
56.15%  
2002  
(19 Oct.) 
Ireland  Treaty of Nice (2
nd) 48.45% 
Yes 
62.89% 
2005 
(20 Feb.) 
Spain  Constitutional Treaty   42.32%  
Yes 
76.72% 
2005 
(29 May)  
France Constitutional  Treaty  69.37% 
No 
54.67% 
2005  
(1 June) 
The 
Netherlands 
Constitutional Treaty  62.80% 
No 
61.54% 
2005 
(10 July) 
Luxembourg Constitutional  Treaty  90.44% 
Yes 
56.52% 
2008 
(12 June) 
Ireland  Treaty of Lisbon   53.1% 
No 
53.4% 
Sources: Democracy International, House of Democracy and Human Rights, www.democracy-
international.org, Election Guide, International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES), www.electionguide.org, 
Kaufman B. (ed.) (2005) Initiative & Referendum Monitor 2004/2005, Amsterdam: Initiative & Referendum 
Institute Europe 
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The 1990s saw a total of nine referendums on European issues. The first three 
referendums were held in 1992 in Ireland, France and Denmark on the TEU. The results 
were positive in Ireland and France – although the positive outcome in the French 
referendum was quite thin (51.05% voted yes), the well-known “petit oui”. The outcome 
of the Danish referendum was negative (50.7% voted “no” with 83.1% turnout) and the 
second referendum (after the Danish opt-outs on defense policy, justice and home affairs, 
the euro and union citizenship were secured by the Edinburgh agreement) was held a year 
later (1993) and resulted in a yes. Furthermore, referendums were held in Sweden (1993), 
Austria and Finland (1994) for accession to the EU, with positive outcomes and high 
turnout. Finally, two referendums took place in Ireland and Denmark on the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1998). Both had positive outcomes.  
 
From 2000 onwards, nine referendums have taken place in the EU-15. The Danish 
referendum in 2000 for the adoption of the euro had a negative outcome (53.21% voted 
against joining EMU with a turnout of 87.2%). A year later, the Irish rejected the Nice 
Treaty (53.8% voted “no”), but with a very low turnout (34.79%), while a few months 
later the majority of Swedes (56.15%) rejected participation in EMU, with a turnout in of 
82.60%. The second Irish referendum on the Treaty of Nice in 2002, where there was a 
higher turnout (48.45%), resulted in a yes (62.89% voted in favour).  
 
In 2005, four referendums were held on the CT in Spain, France, Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. The Spanish referendum was marked by low turnout (42.32%) and a 
positive outcome (76.72%). In France and the Netherlands, where the referendums were 
held within the same week, the results were negative (54.67% and 61.54% voted “no”, 
respectively) while turnout was quite high (69.37% in France and 62.80% in the 
Netherlands). The outcome of the referendum in Luxembourg was positive (56.52% in 
favour) despite the fact that it took place after the referendums in France and the 
Netherlands and the process of ratifying the CT had come to a “pause” by then. Turnout 
was 90.44%, as voting in Luxembourg is compulsory. The most recent referendum was   10
held on 12 June 2008 in Ireland on the Treaty of Lisbon. The result was negative (53.4% 
against) and the turnout was 53.1% of eligible voters.  
It should be noted that in 2003, another nine referendums took place in the 2004 
enlargement countries in view of their accession to the EU. All the referendums had 
positive outcomes, with varied levels of turnout.
14  
 
The first conclusion to be drawn is that as the number of European referendums has 
increased, so have the objections of the European citizens, or at least of some of them. 
The question which follows is “Have we reached the limits of the citizens’ ‘permissive 
consensus?’” According to Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) the positive indicators in 
public opinion constituted a permissive consensus, and they suggested that “policy 
makers can probably move in an integrative direction without significant opposition, 
since this permissive consensus would tend to reduce the chances that opposing elites 
could mount an effective counterattack”. Despite the fact that it is not necessarily the 
opposing elites that mount the counterattack, it seems that quite often when governments 
proceed towards an integrative direction, citizens oppose. Are citizens against further 
integration? Should the negative outcomes of European referendums be viewed as an 
indicator of growing public disaffection with European integration, questioning the 
legitimacy of the whole project or as “anomalies” in the European integration process, 
caused by circumstantial factors like bad information campaigns, poor party performance 
or bad timing (e.g. they coincide with bad economic conditions)?  
 
The answer to this question is directly related to the debate of whether European 
referendums mirror citizens’ attitudes towards European integration or they are 
influenced by national political factors, such as e.g. the government’s performance. 
Given the two levels of governance and politics in the European system of governance 
                                                 
14 In particular, the results were as follows: Czech Republic 77.33% in favour, turnout 55.18%, Estonia 
66.83% in favour, turnout 64.06%, Hungary 83.76% in favour, turnout 45.59%, Latvia 67.5% in favour, 
turnout 71.5%, Lithuania 91,07% in favour, turnout 63.37%, Malta 53.65% in favour, turnout 90.91%, 
Poland 77.45% in favour, turnout 58.85%, Slovakia 93.71% in favour, turnout 52.15%, Slovenia 89.64% in 
favour, turnout 60.41%,. Source: Election Guide, International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES), 
www.electionguide.org, Elections and referendums in Europe – Civic Active, 
http://extweb3.nsd.uib.no/civicactivecms/opencms/civicactive/en/. These are not included in the present 
analysis.   11
(national and European) and the fact that referendums take place within the national 
political context, it is expected that referendums are influenced by the national political 
environment. However, to which degree do national politics influence voting behaviour 
in European referendums and to which do they reflect citizens’ affection or disaffection 
with Europe? Are the outcomes of European referendums’ determined by voters’ 
attitudes towards Europe or the national political context?  
 
Some have argued that EU attitudes are irrelevant as far as the referendum outcome is 
concerned, since EU referendums can be regarded as ‘second-order elections’ where only 
national issues, such as the government’s performance, influence voting behaviour.
15 In 
particular, Franklin and his colleagues examined the referendums on the TEU in 
Denmark, France and Ireland and argued that voting behaviour on European referendums 
has similar traits of that in European elections, in that it is influenced by the parties’ 
political standing and government popularity.
16 The argument is that, as parties find it 
difficult to mobilize their supporters in European referendums, they leave much of the 
responsibility to governments. So if the government is unpopular, the unpopularity 
translates into votes against the object of the referendum.
17 Thus, referendums on 
European matters should be viewed in the same way: not so much in terms of the 
European content that is the overt subject of the referendum, but in terms of the domestic 
standing of the governments that is asking for support.
18 
 
                                                 
15 According to Reif and Schmitt (1980), European elections should be best understood as ‘second-order’ 
elections (e.g. local and regional elections), in that voting behaviour is coloured by the political setting and 
the standing of political parties for the next national elections (‘first-order’ elections). As voters, parties and 
the media view ‘second-order’ elections as national party contests, turnout will tend to be lower than in 
national elections and there will be increased protest voting and voter-switching. Reif K. and Schmitt H. 
(1980) “Nine second-order national elections – a conceptual framework for the analysis of the European 
elections results”, European Journal of Political Research, vol.8, pp.3-44 
16 Franklin M.N., Marsh M. and McLaren L. (1994) “Uncorking the bottle: Popular opposition to European 
unification in the wake of Maastricht”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.32, no.4, Franklin M., 
Marsh M. and Wlezien C. (1994) “Attitudes toward Europe and referendum votes: A response to Siune and 
Svensson”, Electoral Studies, vol.13, no.2, pp.117-121, Franklin M.N., Van der Eijk C. and Marsh M. 
(1995) “Referendum outcomes and trust in government: Public support for Europe in the wake of 
Maastricht”, West European Politics, vol.18, no.3 
17 Franklin, Marsh and Wlezien (1994) Electoral Studies, p.118, Franklin, van der Eijk and Marsh (1995) 
West European Politics, p.101 
18 Franklin, Marsh and McLaren (1994) Journal of Common Market Studies, p.462   12
Similarly, Franck (2005) examines the French referendum on the CT in 2005 and 
suggests that the reasons why the French voted “no” were less related to the content of 
the Treaty itself and more to economic and political concerns regarding their country.
19 
According to Jérôme and Vaillant (2005), the French rejection resulted from the fear of 
loss of national identity as a result of the European integration process and the voters’ 
sanction of the French government’s record.
20 
 
However, others have argued that voting behaviour in European referendums reflects 
people’s underlying broad attitudes towards Europe. This attitude-approach therefore 
suggests that it is primarily voters’ attitudes towards European integration that drive 
voting in referendums. Regarding the French referendum on TEU, Ysmal (1993) claimed 
that the outcome of the French referendum on Maastricht in 1992 was linked to voters’ 
European preferences.
21 Similarly, Suine and Svensson (1993) claimed that the outcome 
of the Danish referendum on the TEU in 1992 was the result of the Danish voters’ 
predispositions towards Europe. The authors also stressed  that “a large number of people 
turned against the advice of their party at the referendum”.
22 Regarding the positive 
outcome of the second Danish referendum in 1993, Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard 
(1994) argued that voting behaviour of the Danes both in 1992 and in 1993 was very 
consistent with their attitudes towards European integration.
23 However, in the second 
referendum, their fear of losing national sovereignty was reduced as the Economic 
Monetary Union and the Single Currency were taken off the agenda by the Edinburgh 
Agreement.
24 Similarly, Svensson (2002), claims that although other matters like the way 
the campaigns are run play an important role, the “results of Danish referendums on 
                                                 
19 Franck Ρ. (2005) “Why did a majority of French voters reject the European Constitution?”, European 
Journal of Political Economy, vol.21, no. 4, pp.1071-1076, p.1072 
20 Jérôme B. and Vaillant N.G. (2005) “The French rejection of the European constitution: An empirical 
analysis”, European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 21, no.4, pp. 1085–1092, p.1085-6 
21 Ysmal C. (1993) “France”, European Journal of Political Research, vol.24, no.4, pp.425-434, p.431 
22 Siune K. and Svensson P. (1993) “The Danes and the Maastricht Treaty: The Danish EC Referendum of 
June 1992”, Electoral Studies, vol.12, no.2, pp.99-111, p.102-3 
23 Siune K., Svensson P. and Tonsgaard O. (1994) “The European Union: The Danes Said ‘No’ in 1992 but 
‘Yes’ in 1993: How and why?”, Electoral Studies,  vol.31, no.2, pp.107-116, p.115 
24 Siune K., Svensson P. and Tonsgaard O. (1994) “The European Union: The Danes Said ‘No’ in 1992 but 
‘Yes’ in 1993: How and why?”, Electoral Studies,  vol.31, no.2, pp.107-116, p.107,113   13
European integration express more than merely the popularity of the government calling 
the referendum”.
25  
Examining the two Irish referendums on the Nice Treaty, Garry, Marsh and Sinnott 
(2005) found that the issue-voting model outperforms the second-order model in both 
referendums. Their analysis suggests that although the effect of satisfaction/ 
dissatisfaction with the incumbent government (i.e. the second-order effect) is detectable, 
it played a much smaller role in determining the outcome compared with the effect of 
attitudes to a range of European issues.
26 They also concluded that the first Nice Treaty 
referendum campaign was a classic case of an ineffective campaign, with low levels of 
citizen interest in, and knowledge of, the treaty.
27 
 
Finally, Hobolt (2003) argued that the relative importance of EU attitudes and national 
factors is determined by a significant element in the national political context, namely the 
level of EU salience.
28 She tested these propositions by analyzing the level of EU 
salience and EU attitude stability in Ireland and Denmark and suggested that the 
importance of European attitudes varies according to the national political context.
29  
 
II. Methodology 
Within this debate and in light of the increasing number of European referendums, it 
would be useful to have a better understanding of European citizens’ voting behaviour. 
What determines Europeans’ vote in referendums? What are the reasons for voting “yes” 
or “no” in a European referendum? Are those voting “no”, against further integration? 
                                                 
25 Svensson P. (2002) “Five Danish referendums on the European Community and European Union: A 
critical assessment of the Franklin thesis”, European Journal of Political Research, vol.41, no.6, p.747 
26 Garry J., Marsh M. and Sinnott R. (2005) “’Second-order’ versus ‘issue-voting’ effects in EU 
referendums”, European Union Politics, vol.6, no.2, pp.201-221, p.215 
27 Garry J., Marsh M. and Sinnott R. (2005) “’Second-order’ versus ‘issue-voting’ effects in EU 
referendums”, European Union Politics, vol.6, no.2, pp.201-221, p.216 
28 Hobolt S.B. (2003) “Europe and the ballot: Voting behaviour in referendums on European integration”, 
Paper presented at the 2nd Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), 
Marburg, Germany, 18-21 September 2003, p.2 
29 Hobolt S.B. (2003) “Europe and the ballot: Voting behaviour in referendums on European integration”, 
Paper presented at the 2nd Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), 
Marburg, Germany, 18-21 September 2003, p.3-4   14
Furthermore, why do some Europeans go and vote and others don’t? What are the 
reasons for abstention?  
 
In the next two sections, we will attempt to answer some of these questions, based on the 
Eurobarometers published by the European Commission. The data used here are the five 
post-referendum Eurobarometer surveys which were conducted after the referendums in 
France, the Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg for the Constitutional Treaty (2005) and 
the one held in Ireland on the Treaty of Lisbon (2008).
30 
 
We will focus on a set of four questions which allows us to grasp voting behaviour. The 
first question examines the “why” behind the vote, i.e. the reasons why people voted as 
they did, as these are provided by voters themselves. In particular, the respondents are 
asked to give all the reasons why they voted yes or no (What are all the reasons why you 
voted “Yes” / no at the referendum on the European Constitution?”). They answer 
spontaneously and the interviewers code the answers into several categories (e.g. The 
respondent voted “no” because of fear of rise of unemployment in his country / because 
the economic situation in his country is weak). The results of this methodology are more 
reliable, compared to other methods, where the respondent is asked to choose between 
several answers, or where he/she simply replies whether she agrees or not with a specific 
statement. As this question was not included in the survey on the Spanish referendum, the 
results presented here are from the surveys in France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg 
on the CT and Ireland on the Treaty of Lisbon.
31  
 
The second question considers the “how” of the voting decision, i.e. the mechanism by 
which the voting decision was made. What were the criteria used for voting? Were they 
                                                 
30 Flash Eurobarometer No.171, “The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in France”, June 
2005, European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer No.172, “The European Constitution: Post-referendum 
survey in the Netherlands”, June 2005, European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer No.245, “Post-
referendum survey in Ireland”, July 2008, European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer No.173, “The 
European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in Luxembourg”, July 2005, European Commission 
31 Flash Eurobarometer No.171, “The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in France”, June 
2005, European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer No.172, “The European Constitution: Post-referendum 
survey in the Netherlands”, June 2005, European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer No.245, “Post-
referendum survey in Ireland”, July 2008, European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer No.173, “The 
European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in Luxembourg”, July 2005, European Commission   15
European or national concerns that guided the vote? The survey’s question is “Could you 
tell me what was the key element that led to your vote in this Referendum?” and the 
interviewees are presented with a list of answers, from which they choose one.
32 The list 
includes answers like e.g. your opinion on the EU, your opinion on the social and 
economic situation in your country etc. In this way, an assessment can be made about 
whether the voters’ decision was based on national or European criteria. This question is 
helpful in order to assess the degree to which voters’ decisions were influenced by the 
position of their government or their political party affiliation and allows for an indirect 
test to the “second-order” election hypotheses. It is noted that this question was not 
included in the survey on the Irish referendum, so the results presented here focus on 
Spain, France, Netherlands and Luxembourg.  
 
The third question is about the “when” of the voting decision, i.e. the timing. The 
survey’s question is phrased “Can you tell me roughly when did you make up your mind 
how you would vote in the Referendum on the European Constitution?”. The respondents 
are presented with a list of answers, of which they choose one.
33 This question allows for 
an assessment of voters’ stability of opinion regarding their decision. Did they decide 
early on, or was their vote influenced by the campaign? 
 
The last question addresses the issue of abstention. The question used in the survey is: “If 
you did not go to vote in the Referendum, is it because … ?”. Respondents are presented 
with a list of answers with which they are asked to agree or disagree. This question sheds 
some light on why voters abstain. As such, it can provide some insights regarding voting 
behaviour and abstention in European electoral procedures. 
 
                                                 
32 The answers include: - Your opinion on the European Constitution - Your overall opinion regarding the 
European Union - Your opinion of those who led the "YES" campaign - Your opinion of those who led the 
"NO" campaign - Your opinion on the economic and social situation in France / Netherlands / LUX. The 
last sentence was not included in the Spanish survey. 
33 The answers include: - At the time the Referendum was announced - At the beginning of the campaign /  
Fairly early on during the Referendum campaign - In the final weeks of the campaign /  Only in the last 
weeks - The week before the Referendum - - On the day of the Referendum itself - After French and Dutch 
referendums’ results. The final answer was included only in the survey for Luxembourg which was held a 
month after the French and Dutch referendums.    16
 
 
III. Results 
1. Why “yes” and why “no”  
At first, we will examine voting behaviour in terms of positive and negative voting. The 
following section presents the findings from the referendums in France, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg and on the Constitutional Treaty (CT) and Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty. 
This question was not included in the Spanish survey.  
France 
As far the motivations behind the French “yes” vote are concerned, the most common 
answer was that the CT was seen as “essential in order to pursue the European 
construction”. This answer was given by 39% of the respondents. 25% of the respondents 
provided reasons which largely fell into the category “other” and unfortunately were not 
specified in the survey. “I’ve always been in favour of the European construction” was 
the reason mentioned by 16% of the interviewees who voted “yes”. 12% of the 
respondents justified their “yes” vote by saying that the Constitutional Treaty 
“strengthens the role of France within the EU / in the world”. 11% of the respondents 
voted “yes” because they thought the CT would “strengthen the EU over the United 
States” and 11% for “the future generations”. This sentence is not further clarified in the 
survey.
34 Finally, only 8% cast a positive vote because the CT was seen as “First steps 
towards / a symbol of a political unification of Europe” and equally 8% because it would 
“strengthen France’s economic and social situation”.
35 
 
Regarding the “no” votes, the main consideration was the economic situation in France 
and in particular unemployment. 31% of the French respondents said they cast a negative 
vote because the CT would “have negative impact on the employment situation in 
                                                 
34 Flash Eurobarometer No.171, “The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in France”, June 
2005, European Commission 
35 Flash Eurobarometer No.171, “The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in France”, June 
2005, European Commission   17
France”, and 26% because “the economic situation in France is too weak / there is too 
much unemployment”. The perception that “economically speaking, the draft is too 
liberal economically” was the reason provided by 19% of the respondents, while 18% 
mentioned that they voted “no” because they “were opposed to the President of the 
Republic/the national government/certain political parties”. In line with the social and 
economic concerns of the “no” voters, 16% claimed that “there was not enough social 
Europe” in the CT. Finally, the fact that the CT was “too complex” was mentioned by 
12% of the respondents. It is interesting to note that “opposition to Turkey’s accession” 
or to “further enlargement” were not main considerations (mentioned only by 6% and 3% 
of the interviewees respectively). It should be noted that 21% of the “no” voters provided 
motivations which fell into the category “other”, which remains unspecified. 
 
The objections of the French concerned social-economic issues relating to their 
country, such as unemployment, fear of relocation of French enterprises and the 
economic situation. It should be added that in the same survey, 88% of the respondents 
considered France’s membership of the EU is a good thing. 
The Netherlands 
The reasons why the Dutch voted “yes” were similar to those of the French. 24% of the 
respondents voted “yes” because it was perceived as “essential in order to pursue the 
European construction” (just like 39% of the French). Some Dutch cast a positive vote 
because the Constitutional Treaty would “strengthen the feeling of a European identity” 
(13%), while others because it would “strengthen the role of the Netherlands within the 
Union/in the world” (13%). The CT was viewed as “essential for the smooth running of 
the European institutions” by 12% of the respondents, and the “first steps towards/ 
Symbol of a political unification of Europe” by another 10%. Finally, a few respondents 
voted “yes” because the CT would “strengthen the European Union over the United 
States” (10%) and because it would “strengthen the economic and employment situation/ 
the economic cooperation” (10%).
36  
 
                                                 
36 Flash Eurobarometer No.172, “The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in the Netherlands”, 
June 2005, European Commission   18
The motivations behind the Dutch “no” vote were quite different from those of the 
French. When asked to mention all the reasons why they voted “no” at the referendum on 
the European Constitution, 32% of respondents mentioned “lack of information”. The 
fear of “loss of national sovereignty” was mentioned by 19% of the Dutch, and 
“opposition to the national government/ certain political parties answered” was the reason 
given by 14% of the respondents. 13% of the Dutch “no” voters gave the justification 
“Europe is too expensive”. Finally, only 8% replied “I am against Europe / European 
construction / European integration”. 
 
In the Netherlands, the main reasons behind the negative vote were lack of 
information and fear of loss of national sovereignty. It is noted that at the time of the 
survey, 82% of Dutch felt the country's participation in the EU is a good thing. 
Luxembourg 
As far as Luxembourg is concerned, the main motivation behind the “yes” vote was that 
the CT was perceived as “essential in order to pursue the European construction”. This 
was mentioned by 39% of respondents, exactly the same percentage as in the French 
survey. “For peace in Europe” was the justification provided by 28% of the “yes” voters, 
while 23% mentioned that the CT would “strengthen Luxembourg’s role within the EU 
/in the world”. 18% of the respondents voted “yes” for the (largely unclear) “future 
generations”. Some justified their vote by saying that the CT would “strengthen the 
economic and social situation in Luxembourg” (16%) and others by viewing it as the 
“first steps / a symbol for social Europe” (16%). Some “yes” voters mentioned that they 
“had always been in favour of the European construction” (15%). Finally, 14% of the 
“yes” voters said that the CT would “strengthen the European identity”. The same 
percentage (14%) felt that the European constitution was “essential for the smooth 
running of European the institutions”.
37 It should be noted that 25% of the “yes” voters 
provided answer that fell into the category “other”, the same percentage as with the 
French respondents.  
 
                                                 
37 Flash Eurobarometer No.173, “The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in Luxembourg”, 
July 2005, European Commission   19
The reasons for the “no” vote were primarily national, just like in France. 37% of the 
“no” voters thought the CT “would have negative effects on the employment situation 
Luxembourg/ relocation of enterprises” (in France this was 31%).
38 The fact that “the 
economic situation in Luxembourg is too weak/ there is too much unemployment” was 
mentioned by 23% of the respondents and 22% felt that the CT would not sufficiently 
promote a “social Europe”. 20% of the respondents said they voted “no” because the 
“draft goes too far/advances too quickly”. Finally, “opposition to Turkey’s accession”, 
the complexity of the text (“too complex) and lack of information were mentioned 
equally by 17% of the respondents.
39 
 
Although the outcome of the referendum in Luxembourg was positive, the concerns of 
the citizens of Luxembourg coincide with those of French: unemployment, 
relocation companies from the country abroad and concern for economic and social 
conditions. 
Ireland 
Regarding the Irish, when asked to justify their “yes” vote in the referendum for the 
Lisbon Treaty, the most common answer was that “It was in the best interest of Ireland”. 
This was mentioned by 56.9% of the respondents. The second most popular motivation 
was “Ireland gets a lot of benefit from the European Union”, mentioned by 33.8%. 16.3% 
of the Irish replied that they voted in favour of the Lisbon Treaty because “It keeps 
Ireland fully engaged in Europe”, while the perception that it would “help the Irish 
economy” was mentioned by 14.9% of the Irish.
40 
 
Regarding the reasons for “no” voting, the most popular answer was lack of information. 
The response “Because I do not know enough about the treaty and would not want to vote 
for something I am not familiar with” was given by 34.7% of the respondents. 19.5% of 
the Irish said they voted “no” to “protect the Irish identity”. “To safeguard Irish neutrality 
in security and defence matters” and “I do not trust politicians” was equally mentioned by 
                                                 
38 The same percentage (37%) mentioned reasons which were coded as “other”. 
39 Flash Eurobarometer No.173, “The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in Luxembourg”, 
July 2005, European Commission 
40 Flash Eurobarometer No.245, “Post-referendum survey in Ireland”, July 2008, European Commission   20
10.3% of the respondents.
41 Finally, 9.4% of the respondents said they voted “no” 
because [Ireland] “will lose our right to have an Irish Commissioner in every 
Commission”.
42 
 
In Ireland, therefore, the main reasons behind the negative vote was the lack of 
information, while the fear of loss of national identity / Irish specificity on social 
issues (abortion, gay marriages, etc.) and security and defense also played a part. It 
should also be noted that according to the same survey, 87% of Irish people support the 
participation of their country in the EU.  
 
So, the objections of the French, Dutch and Irish were not about European integration in 
general. In all three countries, the majority of respondents were in favour of their 
country’s participation in the EU country which implies that we have not reached the 
limits of the “permissive consensus”. Citizens were not necessarily opposed to a further 
integration (which would lead us to the conclusion that at least for some Europeans, the 
limits of “permissive consensus” have been reached). Instead, the objections of citizens 
concerned specific issues: For the French, it was unemployment, the economic situation 
and the fear of French companies being relocated outside France with the consequent 
decrease in employment. The same issues concerned citizens of Luxembourg, despite the 
fact that the referendum had a positive outcome. For the Dutch, the reason behind the 
negative votes was lack of information, combined with concern about the loss of national 
sovereignty. Similarly, lack of information was the primary reason behind the Irish no, as 
well as fear of loss of national sovereignty.  
 
Both in the Netherlands and in Ireland and to a smaller degree in France, the lack of 
information or, more accurately, the subjective assessment of lack of information  played 
a key role in voting “no”. 
 
                                                 
41 Flash Eurobarometer No.245, “Post-referendum survey in Ireland”, July 2008, European Commission 
42 Flash Eurobarometer No.245, “Post-referendum survey in Ireland”, July 2008, European Commission   21
In all three countries where the results were negative (France, Netherlands, Ireland), 
general support for European integration and a sense that participation in the EU is 
something positive for their country was enough for “yes” voters. Instead, for citizens 
who cast a negative vote, concerns about issues affecting their country played a bigger 
role than their general pro-European predisposition. The vote of the citizens seem to have 
a national and European dimension, with the national dimension prevailing in the “no” 
voters and the European in the “yes” votes. This, however, is not the case for Ireland 
where both the negative and positive vote were motivated by national concerns.  
 
2. The “how” 
In this section, there will be an examination of the mechanism of the decision-making. 
Did the voters decide based on national or European preoccupations? This was the 
question “Could you tell me what was the key element that led to your vote in this 
Referendum?” and respondents were permitted to choose only one answer. 
 
As far as the Spanish are concerned, the vote was guided by European preoccupations for 
the majority of the respondents (59%). 26% said the key element that led to their vote in 
this Referendum was their opinion on the European Constitution and 33% their overall 
opinion regarding the EU. 15% mentioned that it was their opinion of those who led the 
“yes” campaign. Only 1% voted as they did because it would be “a good thing for Spain”. 
It should be noted that this percentage of “European” considerations that led the vote 
rises to 66% for the “yes” voters and falls to 41% in the “no” voters.
43  
 
In France, again a large part of the voters seem to have decided how to vote based on 
European criteria (50%). 18% voted according to their opinion of the European 
Constitution and 32% on their opinion of the EU. The same percentage (32%) decided 
how to vote based on their opinion of the economic and social situation in France (this 
statement was not available in the Spanish survey). It should be noted that amongst the 
French “yes” voters, 68% of them voted based on European criteria, i.e. the decision was 
                                                 
43 The statement “your opinion on the economic and social situation in Spain” was not included in the 
Spanish survey.    22
mostly “European” and only 11% based on the economic and social situation in France. 
Conversely, 47% of the “no” voters decided based on the economic and social situation 
in France and only 37% based on their “European” opinion (either on the European 
Constitution, 20% or the EU, 17%).  
 
Table 2: Factor determining the vote 
Key element that led to vote      
 Spain  France 
The 
Netherlands Luxembourg
Your opinion on the European 
Constitution 26  18  18  22 
Your overall opinion regarding the 
European Union  33 32  31  35 
Your opinion of those who led the 
"YES" campaign  15  7  11  10 
Your opinion of those who led the 
"NO" campaign  4  4  6  5 
It's my duty as citizen  3       
It's my right as citizen  1       
It is a good thing for Spain  1       
Your opinion on the economic and social 
situation in France /NL /LUX (FR/NL /LUX 
only)  32  21 24 
Other 7  5  8  2 
DK / NA  8  3  3  2 
 
The same applied for the Dutch. 59% of the “yes” voters decided based on European 
criteria (15% on their opinion of the Constitution and 44% on their opinion of the EU). 
This percentage falls to 44% for the “no” voters. Furthermore, 28% of the “no” voters 
cast their vote based on the economic and social situation in the Netherlands, compared 
to 11% of the “yes” voters.    23
 
In Luxembourg, 62% of the “yes” voters voted “European” (13% by their opinion on the 
Constitution and 49% by their opinion on the EU) and only 21% on their opinion of the 
economic and social situation in Luxembourg. However, 30% of the “no” votes were 
based on national considerations and 52% on European. 
 
In France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, there is an association between the 
“Europeaness” of the vote and the vote itself. For the voters who are pro-European, the 
general idea that European integration is a positive process and their country’s 
participation in the EU is a good thing seems enough to make them cast a positive vote. 
However, for some national considerations prevail over their pro- European disposition. 
This is particularly evident in France. 52% of the French “yes” decided based on their 
“overall opinion regarding the European Union” and 16% on their “opinion on the 
European Constitution”. Only 11% of those chose the sentence “Your opinion on the 
economic and social situation in France”. On the contrary, among the “no” voters this 
number reaches 47%.  
 
Two points need attention. First, it should be noted that although the vote has a European 
dimension, it is based on an overall impression and opinion on Europe not on the actual 
text of the CT. Second, it should be noted that although this particular question was not 
included in the Irish survey, one can tell a significant difference from analyzing the 
previous question “What are the reasons why you voted yes/no”. As was mentioned, the 
most popular answer behind the “yes” vote was that the Lisbon Treaty was perceived to 
be “in the best interest of Ireland” (56.9%) followed by “Ireland gets a lot of benefit from 
the European Union” (33.8%). It is interesting to note that although for the French, the 
Dutch and the Luxembourgian the “yes” vote was mainly European and “no” national, in 
the case of Ireland, both the “yes” and the “no” vote were nationally motivated.  
 
3. The “when”    24
Regarding the timing of the voting decision, respondents were asked “Can you tell me 
roughly when did you make up your mind how you would vote in the Referendum on the 
European  Constitution?” and had to choose one answer from a list. The list included the 
following answers: At the time the Referendum was announced; At the beginning of the 
campaign / Fairly early on during the Referendum campaign; After French and Dutch 
referendums’ results (LUX only); Only in the last weeks / In the final weeks of the 
campaign; The week before the Referendum; On the day of the Referendum itself; Don’t 
know/ No answer. 
 
Table 3. Timing of the decision  
 SP  FR  NL  LUX  IRE 
At the time the Referendum was 
announced 35  29  26  29  10.3 
Fairly early on during the 
Referendum campaign /  At the 
beginning of the campaign (IRE 
only) 23  29  21  22  18.7 
After French and  
Dutch referendums’  
results (LUX only)   4  
Only in the last weeks (IRE only)          55.4 
In the final weeks of the campaign  16  20  20  23   
The week before the Referendum  15  14  21  17   
On the day of the Referendum itself  10  7  11  6  15.2 
DK/ NA  2  1  0  0  0.4 
 
 
It is interesting to note that in the four countries (Spain, France, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) voters made up their minds quite early on. 35% of the Spanish, 29% of the 
French, 26% of the Dutch and 29% of the Luxembourgian decided at the time the 
Referendum was announced. 23% of the Spanish, 29% of the French, 21% of the Dutch   25
and 22% of the Luxembourgian decided how to vote “fairly early on during the 
Referendum campaign”.  
16% of the Spanish, 20% of the French and the Dutch and 23% of the Luxembourgian 
decided in the final weeks of the campaign and 15% of the Spanish, 14 of the French, 
21% of the Dutch and 17% of the Luxembourgian decided the week before the 
Referendum.  
 
On the contrary, 55.4% of the Irish said they decided how to vote “only in the last 
weeks”. Some of them had decided early on (10.3% at the time the referendum was 
announced and 18.7% at the beginning of the campaign). 15.2% of the Irish decided on 
the day of the referendum itself. This finding confirms earlier finding about the relative 
instability of the Irish European predispositions.
44  
 
In the Spanish, French, Dutch and Luxembourgian referendums voters made up their 
mind quite early on. This is not the case for the referendum in Ireland, where voters 
decided quite late in the campaign. This is important in two ways: First, it shows that the 
French and the Dutch “no”s are different both in “weight” and seriousness that than of 
the Irish. Second, it shows that in Ireland the campaign played an important role in 
determining the outcome of the referendum.  
 
4. Participation  
This section will focus on the reasons for abstention. In particular, we will consider the 
answers given by respondents in the referendums in France, the Netherlands, Spain and 
Ireland (in Luxembourg attendance is mandatory).  
France 
There were many reasons why French citizens abstained, ranging from personal 
circumstances which prevented voters from turning out, a lack of interest in politics in 
                                                 
44 Hobolt S.B. (2003) “Europe and the ballot: Voting behaviour in referendums on European integration”, 
Paper presented at the 2nd Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), 
Marburg, Germany, 18-21 September 2003, p.15   26
general or European affairs. The most popular answer provided by the French for not 
going to vote was that they were “held up that day”.
45 Unfortunately, this is a totally 
subjective response from which no definite conclusions can be drawn. Essentially it is not 
possible to know whether the respondent intended to vote but was prevented because of 
circumstance, or some other activity was considered more important than voting in the 
referendum.  
 
From the rest of the answers, it is clear that abstention is associated with the (subjective) 
sense of being badly informed coupled with the perception that the text of the CT was 
complicated. The next most popular reasons are related to the voters’ perception of lack 
of information. In particular, 60% of the respondents said that they thought “the text was 
too complicated”, while 49% believed that they “were not sufficiently informed on the 
Constitution to go vote”. 30% of the French abstained because they “believed that voting 
at the referendum would not change anything” while 29% said they are “not interested in 
politics, by elections in general”. Finally, 27% of the respondents abstained because they 
“wished to penalize the Government (the president of the Republic for France)”.
46 
Netherlands 
As far as the Dutch are concerned, when asked why they abstained, the most popular 
answer was that they believed that they “were not sufficiently informed on the 
Constitution to go vote” (51%).
47 41% of the respondents claimed that “something 
prevented me from voting”. 26% abstained because they thought “the text was too 
complicated” and another 26% said they believed that “voting at the referendum would 
not change anything”. 24% of the Dutch did not vote because they were “not interested in 
politics, by elections in general” and 23% because they “are not interested in the 
European Constitution”. The same percentage (23%) claimed “It was not worth to vote 
because it was clear that the ‘no’ would win in any case”.
48 
                                                 
45 Flash Eurobarometer No.171, “The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in France”, June 
2005, European Commission 
46 Flash Eurobarometer No.171, France, 2005 
47 Flash Eurobarometer No.172, “The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in the Netherlands”, 
June 2005, European Commission 
48 Flash Eurobarometer No.172, Netherlands, 2005,    27
 
Lack of information seems to be the same reason for the abstention in the Dutch 
referendum.  
Spain 
In the Spanish survey, the question on turnout was phrased different: “Which of the 
following statements best describes why you did not vote in the referendum?”. The 
respondents could choose up to three.
49  
 
It is interesting to note that the most popular answer to this question was “I don’t know”, 
and was chosen by 71% of the respondents. Lack of information was the reason given by 
30% of the respondents. 28% claimed that they “really intended to vote but circumstances 
on the day prevented them”. 13% said they “are just not interested in politics” while 10% 
said that “there has been a lack of public debate, a lack of electoral campaign”. 
 
Regarding the Spanish referendum, information was an important factor influencing the 
low turnout but abstention was also a result of apathy and indifference. It should be noted 
the feeling of being badly informed which was expressed by a large proportion of 
Spaniards actually corresponds to low levels of information.
50 
                                                 
49 The answers were: You really intended to vote but circumstances on the day prevented you; You are not 
interested in politics, by elections in general / you are just not interested in politics; You are not interested 
in the European Union; You are not interested in the Constitution for Europe; Vote has no consequences / 
does change anything; You did not have enough information ; You did not know there was a Referendum; 
There has been a lack of public debate, a lack of electoral campaign; The European Constitution is too 
complex; No point in voting because obvious that "Yes" be chosen anyway; Other; Don’t know / No 
answer 
50 It should be noted that in the same survey, there were some questions regarding the actual levels of 
information of the respondents. The Spanish were presented with a set of statement about the CT and were 
requested to comment whether they were true or false. Regarding the position of the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, 18% thought the sentence “The position of Minister for Foreign Affairs of the European Union will 
be created” was false and 32% respondents did not know. The sentence “At least one million people may 
require the adoption of European legislation” was considered false by 19% and 36% of the respondents did 
not know. 43% of the Spanish said the statement “The President of the European Union will be elected 
directly by citizens” was correct, while 36% answered “I don’t know”. Regarding the creation of a direct 
European tax (“A common direct European tax will be created”), the respondents were equally divided 
between considering the statement correct (34%), incorrect (34%) and don’t knows (31%). With regard to 
national citizenship (the sentence was that “national citizenship will disappear”, the majority of respondents 
thought it was false (70%) and minorities, 13% and 18% considered the true and not commented 
respectively. Finally, regarding the sentence “A Member State can leave the EU if it wants”, 53% 
commented that it is true, 24% that it was false and 23% respondents do not know. With the exception of   28
Ireland 
As far as the Irish are concerned, the most popular answer for abstaining was that they 
“felt they did not fully understand the issues raised by the referendum” (52.3% of the 
respondents) 44.6% of the Irish said they abstained because they were “too busy” while 
41.9% felt that they “were not informed about the issues at stake”.
51 38.1% of the 
respondents said they “had more important things to do” than go to vote while 36.9% did 
not vote because they “were not informed about the content of the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, 
33.7 of the abstainers felt “turned off” by the political campaigns around the referendum 
turned you off.  
 
In the Irish referendum, the subjective feeling of being badly informed played an 
important part in influencing turnout at the day of the referendum.  
 
In conclusions, in all four countries (France, Netherlands, Spain and Ireland), the 
subjective sense of being or not informed played an important role in the decision to go to 
the ballot box. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Increasingly, European governments have held referendums on European issues. With 
this increase in European referendums, there has been a rise of negative outcomes on 
issues regarding European integration. Although citizens do not seem to be against 
European integration, their concerns were specific. For the French, it was the rise of 
unemployment, the economic situation and the concern about French companies moving 
outside France. These same concerns were shared by the citizens of Luxembourg, despite 
the fact that the referendum had a positive outcome. Both the Netherlands and Ireland, a 
major reason for negative voting was lack of information or, more accurately, the sense 
of being badly informed information. In both these countries, negative voting was also 
motivated by a fear of loss of national sovereignty. With regard to the relation between 
                                                                                                                                                 
the abolition of national citizenship, which was considered untrue by the majority of Spaniards, in all the 
other issues concerning the Constitutional Treaty, the Spaniards were poorly informed.,  
51 Flash Eurobarometer No.245, “Post-referendum survey in Ireland”, July 2008, European Commission   29
voting and feeling informed, it appears to be interactive. People who feel more informed, 
tend to cast a positive vote, but also those who are pro-European consider themselves to 
be better informed.  
 
Regarding the effect of national politics on voting, it does not appear to be strong, at least 
as far as these surveys are concerned. The approach of referendums as second-order 
elections is useful in highlighting the way referendums are influenced by the national 
political system and coloured by the standing of parties in the domestic political arena. 
However, it does not capture the whole picture. According to the findings here, voting 
behaviour in European referendums seems to have both a European and a national 
dimension and does not simply express opposition to government or certain political 
parties. For some voters, their impression that European integration is a “good thing” and 
their conviction that the treaty in question is necessary in pursuing it are reasons enough 
to vote yes. For others, it seems that national preoccupation take precedence over their 
pro-European attitudes.  
 
Regarding the turnout in the referendums, it is related to feelings of being informed. This 
is the case for the referendums in the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland and to a lesser 
extent in France.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that the Irish seem to be a special case in several ways. First, 
voters seem to have been mainly preoccupied by their national interest. “Yes” voters 
differed from “no” voters in that the first groups saw the Irish interest through Europe 
(and hence in favour of the Lisbon Treaty) and the second through Irish independence 
(and therefore against the Lisbon) Treaty. On the contrary, in France, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Spain voters made their mind up through a combination of European 
and national considerations. Furthermore, in the Spanish, French, Dutch and 
Luxembourgian , citizens made up their mind quite early on after the referendum was 
announced. However, in Ireland, voters decided quite late in the campaign.  
   30
Drawing from all five surveys, it is evident that levels of information, and subjective 
evaluation of one’s level of information in particular, played an important role in 
determining the outcome (Netherlands, Ireland) or abstention levels (Ireland, France, 
Netherlands, Spain). In light of this, and the upcoming second Irish referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty, greater weight should be given to effective and lengthy campaigns which 
will allow for voters to understand issues and come to an informed decision.  
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